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BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS? NINTH CIRCUIT MAKES
WAVES REFUSING TO NARROW CLEAN WATER ACT IN
HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND V. COUNTY OF MAUI
I. GETTING OUR FEET WET: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CLIMATE
SURROUNDING THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Like water itself, water regulation can be just as fluid, a series
of imperfect attempts to contain an uncontainable force of nature.1
In efforts to harness water’s resources for their personal benefit,
humans consequently pollute the water sources fundamental to
their subsistence.2  As pollution concerns have increased over time,
the legislature has passed statutes such as the Clean Water Act
(CWA) to remedy past and present water source contamination.3
The CWA aims to uphold water integrity and eliminate toxic
pollutant discharges into waters mutually utilized by humans and
wildlife.4  In modern society, achieving this goal proves more than
challenging.5  As politics influences government agencies, adminis-
trative goals affect the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s
considerations when implementing environmental safeguards.6
President Trump’s pro-industry administration holds eco-
nomic growth of paramount concern, an issue undoubtedly at the
1. See Robin Kundis Craig & Anna M. Roberts, When Will Governments Regulate
Nonpoint Source Pollution? A Comparative Perspective, 42 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(2015) (noting differing standards and enforcement of water regulations amongst
states).
2. See Water Pollution, NAT’L INST. OF ENVTL. HEALTH SCI., https://www.
niehs.nih.gov/health/topics/agents/water-poll/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 6,
2018) (describing human activities polluting water sources such as fertilizer runoff
and sewage disposal).
3. Congressional Declaration of Goals and Policy, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (2012)
(detailing policy concerns behind Clean Water Act and implementation goals).
4. Id. § 1251(a) (outlining current and future Clean Water Act objectives).
The CWA strives to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters” and eliminate pollution to navigable waters by
1985. Id. (stating CWA’s main purpose).  While water pollution was not eliminated
by 1985, the CWA sets up future plans to regulate non-point source pollution to
further this goal. See id. § 1251(a)(7) (showing legislators intended further regula-
tion in future).
5. See Water Pollution, supra note 2 (discussing negative effect of infrastructure
modernization on environment).
6. See Matthew R. Bowles, Speak Now or Forever Be Overruled: Deferring to Political
“Judgement” in EPA Rulemakings, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 591, 592-93 (2013)
(describing judicial deference to EPA’s political considerations as long as consider-
ations are reasonable and disclosed to public).
(351)
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forefront of current policy.7  When industrial growth enters
through the doorway, however, environmental effects follow shortly
behind.8  EPA regulations force industry leaders to question where
their pollutants settle.9  The more stringent EPA regulations be-
come, the more companies must invest to implement environmen-
tally safe practices.10  Consequently, the administration must
balance the interests of fostering business in the United States with
environmental compliance costs.11
In Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui,12 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit highlighted water pollution
concerns resulting from modern ways of life.13  Despite public opin-
ion that most water pollution arises from factories directly unload-
ing pollutants into oceans, studies show runoff and groundwater
transport the vast majority of pollution into national waters.14  The
7. See Thomas Heath, How a Trump Presidency Will Affect 15 Industries, WASH.
POST (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/mr-business-
goes-to-washington-now-what/2016/11/12/8c7f7846-a6e2-11e6-ba59-a7d93165c6d
4_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d32b218c1fc7 (noting administrative go-
als to bolster pharmaceuticals, oil, and gas industries).
8. See Eric McLamb, The Ecological Impact of the Industrial Revolution, ECOLOGY
GLOB. NETWORK (Sept. 18, 2011), http://www.ecology.com/2011/09/18/ecologi
cal-impact-industrial-revolution/ (describing negative environmental impacts of
Industrial Revolution and how further modern expansion increases environmental
risks).
9. See generally Dorothy Allen Kellogg, Comments of the National Rural Electric
Cooperative Association (NRECA), NRECA (May 21, 2018), https://www.cooperative.
com/programs-services/government-relations/regulatory-issues/Documents/NRE
CA%20Comments%20on%20Hydrologic%20Connection%20Comments.pdf
(commenting in favor of EPA rule change by arguing regulation of indirect dis-
charges is impractical).
10. Id. (describing costs associated with environmental compliance); see also
Federal Appeals Court Reaffirms Maui Clean Water Act Decision, EARTHJUSTICE (Mar. 30,
2018), https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2018/federal-appeals-court-reaffirms-
maui-clean-water-act-decision (revealing Maui County’s projection of $2.5 million
in costs to comply with Ninth Circuit’s holding).
11. See Timothy P. Carney, EPA Regulations Create Corporate Winners and Losers,
AEI (May 31, 2014), http://www.aei.org/publication/epa-regulations-create-cor
porate-winners-and-losers/ (comparing effects of EPA regulations on businesses in
United States to lower production costs overseas).
12. 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding CWA covers indirect discharges).
13. See id. at 752 (holding CWA covers pollutant discharges with indirect hy-
drological connections to navigable waters).
14. See What is the Biggest Source of Water Pollution in the Ocean?, NAT’L OCEANIC
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (June 25, 2018), https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/pol
lution.html (showing eighty percent of oceanic pollution comes from non-point
source pollution); see also Michael Specter, Sea-Dumping Ban: Good Politics, But Not
Necessarily Good Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/
1993/03/22/us/sea-dumping-ban-good-politics-but-not-necessarily-good-policy.
html (illustrating historical focus regulating direct dumps of pollutants into ocean
despite other factors such as overused sewage systems and runoff actually causing
most damage).
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Ninth Circuit held the CWA permits the EPA to regulate pollution
discharges with indirect hydrological connections to national wa-
ters, provided all other CWA factors are met.15  After the EPA sub-
mitted an amicus brief advising to only implicate those who directly
discharge pollutants, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to abandon the
EPA’s proposal illustrates tensions between the executive and judi-
cial branches.16  With circuit courts split over the CWA’s appropri-
ate scope, Hawaii Wildlife Fund marks a legal movement toward
regulation of indirect pollutant discharges and more environmen-
tally protective application of the CWA.17
This Note examines the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hawaii
Wildlife Fund, beginning with a discussion of the facts in Part II.18
Part III describes the legal background surrounding Hawaii Wildlife
Fund, including a discussion of the CWA and its disputed terms.19
Subsequently, Part IV illustrates the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, and
Part V critically examines the court’s decision.20  Finally, with a po-
tential Supreme Court decision on the horizon, Part VI forecasts
Hawaii Wildlife Fund’s impact on pollution regulation.21
15. See Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 752 (holding CWA covers indirect dis-
charges because those discharges have same effect as direct discharges).
16. See Clean Water Act Coverage of “Discharges and Pollutants” via a Direct
Hydrological Connection to Surface Water, 83 Fed. Reg. 7,126, 7,126-28 (Feb. 2,
2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122) (listing EPA recommendations to limit
CWA coverage to discharges with direct hydrological connection); see also Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (hold-
ing courts may defer to administrative agency when Congress has not directly spo-
ken on issue and agency recommendation is reasonable).
17. See Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436, 447
(6th Cir. 2018) (finding CWA is inappropriate avenue for examining hydrological
connections); see also Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887
F.3d 637, 651 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding both direct and indirect hydrological con-
nections within CWA’s scope).
18. For further discussion of the facts behind Hawaii Wildlife Fund, see infra
notes 22-47 and accompanying text.
19. For further discussion of the CWA and the legal backstory preceding Ha-
waii Wildlife Fund, see infra notes 48-124 and accompanying text.
20. For a summary of the Ninth Circuit’s holding, see infra notes 125-149 and
accompanying text. For a further critical analysis of the court’s rationale, see infra
notes 150-178 and accompanying text.
21. For further discussion of Hawaii Wildlife Fund’s potential impact, see infra
notes 179-200 and accompanying text.
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II. PROBLEMS IN PARADISE? THE FACTS OF HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND
Hawaii’s Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility stored the
majority of West Maui’s liquid waste in four underground wells.22
When studies concluded that pollutants seeped out of the wells and
into the Pacific Ocean via groundwater, environmental organiza-
tions alleged the County of Maui violated the CWA by indirectly
discharging pollutants into the ocean.23  The County pushed back,
arguing that the CWA only imposed liability for direct discharges
into navigable waters.24
A. County Injection Wells
The Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility serves as the pri-
mary water treatment plant for West Maui, Hawaii.25  As part of
Lahaina’s water treatment plan, the facility isolates reusable water
from sewage, resulting in a treated wastewater by-product known as
effluent.26  At the facility’s inception, the County of Maui contem-
plated building an ocean outfall to release the effluent directly into
the Pacific Ocean.27  After weighing environmental concerns, the
County decided to instead store the effluent in four injection
wells.28  Of the four wells, the third and fourth well receive a major-
22. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir. 2018)
(describing function of County’s injection wells).
23. See id. at 742-43 (discussing controversy and procedure of case).
24. See id. at 743 (describing County’s arguments that direct discharge re-
quirement precludes liability for indirect discharges).
25. See id. at 742 (discussing origin of wastewater reclamation facility).
26. Id. (describing facility’s reception of four million gallons of sewage per
day and conversion to irrigation water).  Generally, effluent encompasses liquid
waste discharged into the air or a water source, particularly rivers or oceans. Efflu-
ent, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/effluent
(last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (defining effluent).  The EPA cites biochemical waste,
total suspended solids, fecal matter, pH-altering substances, oil, and grease as the
most conventional types of waste constituting effluent. Learn About Effluent Guide-
lines, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/eg/learn-about-effluent-
guidelines#pollutant (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (describing pollutant types and
levels of regulation).
27. Haw. Wildlife Fund., 886 F.3d at 742 (determining discharge of pollutants
directly into Pacific Ocean is too harmful to coastal waters).
28. Id. (noting four wells inject 2.8 gallons of pollutants per day into ground-
water). Injection wells are devices consisting of long pipes that deposit materials
into underground porous rock formations. General Information About Injection Wells,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/uic/general-information-about-
injection-wells (last visited Dec. 29, 2018) (explaining scientific principles behind
injection wells).  The wells can be located at depths as shallow as soil level or as
deep as bedrock limestone. Id.  In theory, a properly constructed well utilizes the
surrounding rock in conjunction with multiple cement layers to isolate stored sub-
stances from the surrounding environment. Id.  Beginning in the 1930s, munici-
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ity of the facility’s effluent.29  Once the effluent enters the wells, the
treated wastewater filters into groundwater at a rate of approxi-
mately three to five million gallons per day.30
B. Environmental Reviews and Tracer Dye Study
The County of Maui (the County) conducted an environmen-
tal review before the CWA came into effect in 1973.31  The review
determined that waste eventually traveled from the wells, through
groundwater, and into the Pacific Ocean.32  After the CWA took
effect, a follow-up review in 1991 confirmed that thousands of gal-
lons of effluent reached the Pacific Ocean on a daily basis.33
Throughout these years, the County maintained that any adverse
effects on water quality were diminished once the effluent mixed
with ocean waters.34
In 2013, the EPA conducted a tracer dye study with the assis-
tance of the Hawaii Department of Health and the University of
Hawaii.35  Researchers placed dye into injection wells two, three,
and four.36  After eighty-four days, the dye from wells three and
four visibly emerged into the Pacific Ocean from submarine seep-
age points.37
C. Opposition to County Actions
Following the tracer dye results, plaintiffs Hawaii Wildlife Fund
and other environmental organizations brought an action against
palities began to use injection wells as a cost-effective means of waste disposal that
minimized surface water pollution. Id.
29. Haw. Wildlife Fund., 886 F.3d at 743 (explaining high volume exiting wells
three and four reroute effluent flow patterns from well two).
30. See id. at 742 (equating volume of effluent injected into coastal waters to
permanently running one garden hose every meter for 800 meters of coastline).
31. See id. (revealing county consultant informed Maui in both 1973 and 1991
that effluent would enter Pacific Ocean).
32. Id. at 742 (finding effluent would emerge some distance off of West
Maui’s shore).
33. Id. (describing one out of every seven gallons of groundwater entering
Pacific Ocean was effluent).
34. See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui (Haw. Wildlife Fund I), 24 F.
Supp. 3d 980, 985 (D. Haw. 2014)(recounting County’s reasoning for not taking
action throughout environmental review process).
35. See Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 742-43 (describing purpose of study to
determine hydrological connection between wells and Pacific Ocean).
36. See id. at 743 (noting researchers declined to test well one and instead
predicted outcomes based on results from well two).
37. See id. (describing point of effluent emergence as seafloor location close
to shoreline half-mile  southwest from water treatment facility).
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the County in the District Court of Hawaii.38  The plaintiffs alleged
the County violated the CWA by releasing pollutants into navigable
waters without the required National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System (NPDES) permit.39  Although the County applied for a
permit in 2012, they were still awaiting approval at the time of
suit.40
The County did not refute that the Pacific Ocean qualified as a
navigable water or that the effluent was a pollutant as defined
under the CWA.41  Despite acknowledging that effluent from the
wells reached the Pacific Ocean, the County argued it was not liable
under the CWA.42  A recently proposed EPA rule stated the CWA
only requires NPDES permits when pollutants are discharged into
navigable waters through a direct hydrological connection.43  Rely-
ing on the proposed rule, the County argued it did not need an
NPDES permit under the CWA, as effluent discharges reached the
Pacific Ocean indirectly through groundwater.44
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii
granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.45  The County
then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, arguing the CWA only regulates direct discharges of pollu-
tants to navigable waters.46  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court, refusing to defer to the EPA’s recommendations and holding
38. See Haw. Wildlife Fund I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 983 (describing plaintiff’s argu-
ment of discharge without NPDES permit and county’s argument that they applied
for permit).
39. See id. (stating plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgement against de-
fendant).  Plaintiffs included Hawaii Wildlife Fund, Surfrider Foundation, and
West Maui Preservation Association. Id. (describing parties’ arguments).
40. See id. (describing County’s argument that applying for permit is func-
tional equivalent of obtaining permit for purposes of suit).
41. See Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 742 (stating defendant acknowledged
pollution entering Pacific Ocean but disputed amount and diffusion route).
42. See id. at 744 (arguing no liability under CWA for non-point source
discharge).
43. See id. at n.3 (noting proposed rule to impose liability only on direct dis-
charges of pollutants); see also Clean Water Act Coverage of “Discharges and Pollutants”
via a Direct Hydrological Connection to Surface Water, 83 Fed. Reg. 7,126, 7,126-28
(Feb. 2, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122) (allowing comment on pro-
posed rule only imposing liability for direct hydrological connections to surface
water).
44. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 749 (holding defendant liable despite ar-
guments because pollutant discharge is more than de minimus).
45. Haw. Wildlife Fund I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1005 (holding defendant undoubt-
edly violated CWA given facts).
46. See Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 742 (stating County’s appeal of district
court’s use of conduit theory to impose liability for indirect discharges).
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the CWA requires an NPDES permit for indirect pollutant dis-
charges to navigable waters.47
III. MURKY WATERS: A LEGAL BACKGROUND
The CWA, formerly known as the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act, serves as a primary method of preventing water source pol-
lution.48  In addition to monitoring water quality, the CWA
regulates the quantity, composition, and method of pollutant dis-
charged into the nation’s waters.49  Despite a historical deference to
the EPA’s implementation of environmental statutes, the judiciary
now shows opposition to the EPA’s nonparty proposed liability rule
which would narrow the CWA’s reach.50
A. The Clean Water Act (CWA)
In response to national water pollution concerns, the CWA
strives to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal integrity of the Nation’s waters.”51  When a party “(1) dis-
charge[s] (2) a pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from a point
source” without obtaining an NPDES permit, it violates the CWA.52
NPDES permits allow the EPA to regulate the method and quantity
of pollutant discharge with respect to preventing adverse effects on
wildlife and human health.53 To obtain a permit, an entity must
apply to the state where it is located.54  The state then posts the
permit application for public comment.55  Once the EPA deter-
mines that the entity has corrected any permit violations, paid mon-
etary fees and/or fines, and complied with state and national
47. Id. at 752 (holding defendant liable and stating CWA forbids direct and
indirect actions ending in same result).  The court stated the decision “is about
preventing the County from doing indirectly that which it cannot do directly.” Id.
(finding direct and indirect discharges have same effect).
48. See Summary of the Clean Water Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.
epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-water-act (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (ex-
plaining CWA’s basic premises and history).
49. See id. (clarifying CWA’s implementation).
50. See Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at n.3 (stating lack of deference to EPA’s
recommendations).
51. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012) (listing statute’s goals).
52. See Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir.
2001) (defining CWA’s violation factors); see also Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at
744 (utilizing Headwaters analysis).
53. See NPDES Permit Basics, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
npdes/npdes-permit-basics (last visited Sept. 1, 2018) (discussing permit purposes
and requirements).
54. See id. (describing NPDES permit application process).
55. See id. (describing public comment process).
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regulations, the EPA will then authorize the state to issue the
permit.56
In defining the CWA’s factors, the legislature describes “dis-
charge” to mean the release of a pollutant.57  The EPA defines “pol-
lutants” broadly to include any type of waste, ranging from
industrial by-products to sediment particulates.58  “Navigable wa-
ters,” though far less explicit, includes any physically navigable
water as well as the tributaries to that water, such as a stream lead-
ing to a river.59  A “point source” is a “discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance” that carries pollutants, a classification to
which wells belong.60  Despite attempts to streamline the CWA and
define its factors, courts still disagree on how to delineate exactly
when a point source discharge occurs in various situations.61
B. Point Sources
One of the first attempts to further define point sources oc-
curred in 1979 in United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.,62 wherein the
Tenth Circuit held a gold ore sump constituted a point source for
runoff containing a sodium cyanide-hydroxide by-product.63  The
polluted runoff filtered into a nearby river, killing a significant por-
tion of the local fish population.64  The court determined a pollu-
tant’s origin qualifies as a point source under the CWA when the
pollutant can be traced back to an “identifiable point” of
discharge.65
In 1984, courts debated point sources once again in Trustees for
Alaska v. EPA,66 when the Ninth Circuit examined wastewater re-
56. See id. (illustrating NPDES permit requirements).
57. See Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 745-46 (equating discharge to release).
58. See generally id. at 744-45 (showing broad interpretation of pollutant); see
also NPDES Permit Basics, supra note 53 (giving examples of covered pollutants
under CWA).
59. See NPDES Permit Basics, supra note 53 (discussing judicial and administra-
tive’s broad interpretations of navigable waters and listing examples).
60. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 744 (defining point sources and applying
definition to wells).
61. See id. at 744-45 (explaining lack of clarity in CWA and need to define
“point source” in light of “non-point source” to provide clarity).
62. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979) (creating point source definition).
63. See id. at 370, 373 (holding runoff stemming from inadequate construc-
tion of mining site is point source discharge).
64. See id. at 370 (describing melting snow carried runoff into river killing fish
in Rito Seco river).
65. See id. at 373 (finding ability to trace back pollutant to identifiable point
aligns with congressional intent to give “point source” and “discharge” broadest
possible definitions).
66. 749 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1984) (defining point sources further).
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leased from placer mining operations into nearby waters.67  To sep-
arate gold from glacial ice deposits, miners used a sluice box to
filter gold from wastewater solution flowing through the device.68
While the miners argued that mining operation output qualifies as
a non-point source discharge, the Ninth Circuit held the sluice box
was the type of discrete conveyance the CWA contemplated.69  The
decision rendered the wastewater flowing “through” the confined
sluice box to be a point source discharge.70
Courts also tried to demystify point sources through defining
what does not qualify as a point source.71  The Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed “non-point source” pollution in Ecological Rights Foundation
v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,72 which concerned wood preservatives
washing off telephone poles into nearby waters.73  As the parties did
not dispute that the telephone poles released preservatives, the pe-
titioner argued the poles were an identifiable point of discharge
and, therefore, a point source.74  The Ninth Circuit disagreed and
held storm water runoff qualified as non-point source pollution, be-
cause the polluted runoff was never confined or collected.75  Com-
paring the wood preservatives to automobile residue on a highway,
the court stated runoff carrying such pollutants is difficult to trace
or regulate.76  In addition, the court noted if Congress could have
determined a way to regulate diffuse discharges without extreme
difficulty, it would have created a provision in the CWA.77
67. See id. at 552 (describing process of excavating pay dirt from glacial depos-
its and using water and mercury to isolate gold).
68. See id. (describing wastewater by-product consists of sediment, mercury,
and arsenic).
69. See id. at 558 (outlining miners’ argument that CWA defines mining activi-
ties as non-point source activities).
70. See id. (holding sluice box is confined channel to collect wastewater and
thus point source).
71. See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 744-45 (9th Cir.
2018) (identifying what is not point source can clarify what qualifies as point
source).
72. 713 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining non-point source pollution).
73. See id. at 507 (describing how rain caused preservatives to run off of utility
poles into nearby water sources).
74. See id. at 509 (describing plaintiffs’ contention that point sources are any
“‘tangible, identifiable thing’”).
75. See id. at 509-10 (holding utility poles are not point sources because they
were not designed to collect pollutants and its classification as point source was
disputed amongst parties).
76. See id. (finding practicality necessitates limitation on qualifying
discharges).
77. See Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 509-10 (finding poles not within
CWA’s textual definition of point sources).
9
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C. Discharges to Navigable Waters
In addition to challenges interpreting point sources, courts
find it equally challenging to determine when the CWA covers a
pollutant discharge, as exemplified in Northern California River Watch
v. City of Healdsburg.78  In City of Healdsburg, the court established a
two-part, baseline test for determining if a discharge is within the
CWA’s scope.79  In order to establish the requisite “nexus” between
the discharge and the navigable water for the CWA to take effect,
there must be (1) a hydrologic connection between the point
source and the navigable water, and the pollutant must (2) signifi-
cantly alter the physical, chemical, and biological integrity of the
water.80
While City of Healdsburg helps elucidate qualifications for cov-
ered discharges, the case leaves ambiguities as to the hydrologic
connection level required for CWA coverage.81  After Hawaii Wild-
life Fund entered the District Court of Hawaii, the EPA posted a
request for comment, proposing the CWA should require a direct
hydrological connection between the point source and the naviga-
ble water.82  The EPA stated, “[e]ntities releasing pollutants to
groundwater . . . [having] a direct hydrologic connection to the
jurisdictional surface waters may be . . .” affected by how the CWA
defines “discharges.”83  The EPA further acknowledged that pro-
posed changes would directly impact states, tribes, territories, fed-
eral agencies, and industries.84  Previously, the Ninth Circuit
commented on the EPA’s ability to define environmental statutes in
League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren,85 stating the EPA has au-
thority to refine definitions within statues where there is “room for
78. See 496 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding need to examine multiple
hydrological connections separately to determine if point source involved).
79. See id. at 999-1000 (noting navigable waters as main issue on appeal but
hydrological connections must be examined in light of statute’s purpose).
80. See id. (describing test for requisite nexus under CWA).
81. See Clean Water Act Coverage of “Discharges and Pollutants” via a Direct
Hydrological Connection to Surface Water, 83 Fed. Reg. 7,126, 7,126-28 (Feb. 2,
2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122) (noting actions of courts differing from
repeated EPA recommendations).
82. See id. (explaining rule change necessary due to scientific uncertainties
and need to resolve conflicting legal precedent).
83. Id. (stating additional factors such as distance traveled and time for pollu-
tants to emerge should be taken into account).
84. See id. (stating rule change requires industries to reevaluate discharges
and agencies to reconsider municipal projects near waters).
85. 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002) (commenting on EPA’s authority).
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reasonable interpretation . . . .”86  The court further cautioned that
such authority should not contradict congressional intent by alter-
ing terms in situations where the solution is clearly defined.87
D. Direct or Indirect Discharges: Which is Required?
In the 1980s, Sierra Club v. Abston Construction Co.88 held runoff
qualified as point source pollution, challenging preconceived no-
tions of runoff as an indirect discharge immune to the CWA’s cov-
erage.89  The defendants managed a coal mine near a tributary to
Alabama’s Black Warrior River and constructed sediment basins to
collect strip mining runoff.90  Despite the argument that storm
water caused the basin to overflow and water to naturally diffuse
toward the nearby creek, the Fifth Circuit deemed the runoff a
point source discharge.91  The Fifth Circuit asserted the basins were
a point source because they confined and collected runoff before it
entered navigable waters.92  As a result of the decision, diffuse dis-
charges caused by gravity flow, common with storm water runoff,
could potentially qualify as point source discharges under the
CWA.93
For years after Sierra Club, courts followed the indirect dis-
charge approach and continued to do so in Concerned Area Residents
for the Environment v. Southview Farm.94  In Southview Farm, the Sec-
ond Circuit found that liquid manure sprayed from a tank onto a
field constituted a point source discharge, even though runoff car-
86. See id. at 1190 (emphasis omitted) (arguing EPA cannot define entity as
non-point source when it is clearly defined as point source by statute).
87. See id. (finding statute definition contradicts both congressional intent
and established legal precedent).
88. 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980) (defining when runoff is point source
pollution).
89. Id. at 44-45 (holding not all mining activities are non-point source
activity).
90. See id. at 43 (describing sediment basin’s purpose to prevent runoff from
entering creeks and rivers).
91. See id. at 47 (finding runoff may qualify as point source discharge under
correct circumstances).
92. See id. at 45 (agreeing with government’s middle-ground argument that if
pollutant exits confined, discrete conveyance and enters navigable water, it is cov-
ered by CWA).
93. See Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d at 45 (holding runoff discharge via gravity
flow may qualify as point source discharge after fact-specific inquiry).
94. See 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding aerial dispersion of chemicals
from spray nozzle is point source discharge); see also Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v.
Suffolk Cty., 600 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2010) (determining discharge covered by CWA
when pollutants originate from qualifying point source and enter navigable waters
through indirect dispersion means).
11
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ried the manure to nearby water sources.95  Similarly, Peconic
Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk County96 involved aerially sprayed pesticides
settling in local water sources.97  Though the county argued aerially
diffused pollutants were not confined, the Second Circuit held pes-
ticide spraying constituted a point source discharge because the
spraying apparatus served as a discrete conveyance to release
pesticides.98
The Supreme Court addressed the hydrological connection is-
sue in Rapanos v. United States,99 which involved constructed drains
emptying into Michigan wetlands.100  Between an opinion by Justice
Scalia and an extensive concurrence by Justice Kennedy, the Court
determined by a plurality that wetlands qualified as a navigable
water under the CWA.101  In dicta, Justice Scalia remarked that
while the directness of a hydrological connection was not an issue
on appeal, such issues should be determined by reading the CWA
on its face.102  The CWA reads that parties are liable when they dis-
charge pollutants “to navigable waters from any point source.”103  As
the CWA does not state discharges must be direct, indirect dis-
charges should qualify under the act.104  Furthermore, in Carson
Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp.,105 the Ninth Circuit proposal to
require only direct discharges did not coincide with legislative in-
tent to impose strict liability for CWA violations.106  In Carson Har-
bor, the court stated that strict liability is more logical in a system
where direct and indirect discharges are covered by the CWA.107
95. See Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t, 34 F.3d at 118-19 (holding liquid
manure spraying type of human-initiated activity CWA intended to cover).
96. 600 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2010) (focusing on aerial pollution).
97. See id. at 182-84 (recounting county’s efforts to reduce West Nile exposure
by spraying aerial pesticides which eventually settled on certain waters).
98. See id. at 188-89 (finding spray nozzle discrete conveyance and thus point
source discharging pollutants onto navigable waters).
99. 547 U.S. 715, 719-20 (2006) (discussing hydrological connections).
100. See id. at 719-20 (discussing land developing constructing drains and
ditches between eleven and twenty miles away from wetlands).
101. See id. at 757 (vacating Sixth Circuit decision that wetlands do not qualify
as navigable water).
102. See id. at 743 (focusing on “to” and “from” language in statute and refus-
ing to impart extra meaning or qualifications).
103. Id.  (emphasis added) (emphasizing statute’s plain language).
104. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743 (noting Act forbids both direct and indirect
discharges).
105. 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001) (commenting on strict liability standards).
106. See id. at 881 (determining strict liability not necessary under easily defin-
able direct discharge theory).
107. See id. (determining CWA would have causation requirement if Congress
only intended liability for direct discharges).
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Not all discharges require regulation, as illustrated in Greater
Yellowstone Coalition v. Lewis.108  In 2010, Greater Yellowstone ex-
amined toxic waste rock solutions emitted from a mine expansion
operation.109  Investigations showed that water filtering though
waste rock picked up deadly selenium contents, diffused hundreds
of feet through the ground, and eventually resurfaced in nearby
streams, which threatened fish populations.110  The Ninth Circuit
found two potential point source discharges.111  In the first, rain
water entered pits of waste rock before filtering through the soil.112
In the second, a drainage system collected runoff before it diffused
underground.113  The court held that the drainage system was a
point source because it intentionally collected wastewater, while the
pits were not a point source because they did not actually confine
the runoff.114
Some courts favor narrower interpretations of the CWA, for
example, the Seventh Circuit in Inland Steel Co. v. EPA.115  In Inland
Steel, a steel company disposed of ammonia-containing waste in in-
jection wells, which then released the waste into groundwater.116
As the company injected the waste below a layer of non-permeable
rock, the waste could not rise to surface waters.117  The Seventh Cir-
cuit held the company’s actions were not a true point source dis-
charge under the CWA, stating not all wells and injections of
pollutants into waters must be regulated.118
108. See 628 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (examining multiple discharges and
only qualifying half as requiring NPDES permit).
109. Id. at 1146 (noting waste rock contained high selenium concentration).
110. See id. at 1147-48 (describing studies showing waste water diffusion was
hundreds of feet into ground and later surfacing).
111. See id. at 1152-53 (examining confining qualities of sources to determine
if it was point source).
112. See id. (determining water not collected and confined by drain cover
before entering pits).
113. See Greater Yellowstone Coal., 628 F.3d at 1152-53 (finding water running
off cover into drain system was confined and discrete conveyance under CWA).
114. See id. (holding pits do not confine water).
115. See 901 F.2d 1419, 1422 (7th Cir. 1990) (describing injections as dispos-
als and not discharges under CWA).
116. See id. at 1420-22 (describing injection wells’ positioning and depth).
117. See id. at 1420-21 (finding wells located one quarter mile below lowest
aquifer and underneath non-porous rock).
118. See id. at 1422 (stating limitations inherent in CWA).
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E. “Discharge” versus “Disposal”
In light of decisions like Inland Steel, courts must distinguish
between a discharge of pollutants and mere disposals.119  Under the
CWA, the terms are not mutually exclusive.120  The Seventh Circuit
stated all discharges are disposals, but not all disposals are dis-
charges.121  The CWA defines a disposal as a “ ‘discharge, deposit,
injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid
waste.’”122  Meanwhile, a “land disposal” is specifically placing “haz-
ardous waste” into an injection well.123  Discharges, however, are
disposals that have the potential to reach navigable waters of the
United States, such as streams, rivers, lakes, or oceans.124
IV. DREDGING THE WATERS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS
Upon de novo review, the Ninth Circuit concluded the CWA
covers both direct and indirect discharges, holding the County of
Maui liable for releasing pollutants into the Pacific Ocean.125  The
court determined the County could not escape liability solely be-
cause pollutants traveled to the ocean through intermediary
means.126  In affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that direct and indirect pollutant discharges achieve the
same damaging results and held the CWA covers both types of
discharges.127
A. Point Sources
The Ninth Circuit relied on a four-factor test for determining
CWA violations proposed in Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dis-
119. See id. at 1422 (determining EPA distinguished between disposal and
discharge).
120. See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 752 (finding
NPDES permits only required for disposals that are also discharges).
121. Inland Steel Co., 901 F.2d at 1422 (defining differences between two
terms).
122. Id. (emphasis omitted)(clarifying CWA’s definition).
123. See id. (illustrating additional sub-categories of non-CWA covered pollu-
tant releases).
124. See id. (describing discharges with no potential to reach navigable waters
as undeniable disposals not covered by CWA).
125. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 752 (explaining pollutants’ indirect route
through groundwater to ocean did not preclude liability under CWA).
126. Id. at 752 (reasoning indirectly releasing pollutants into ocean has same
effects as directly dumping waste into Pacific Ocean).
127. Id. at 751-52 (alleging County knew effluent’s harmful effects when it
decided against creating direct ocean outfall to dispose pollutants).
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trict.128  Thus, if a party fails to obtain an NPDES permit and “(1)
discharge[s] (2) a pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from a
point source,” the party violates the CWA.129  Neither party con-
tested that effluent was a pollutant and the Pacific Ocean consti-
tuted a navigable water under the Act.130  Additionally, the court
noted that the CWA specifically qualifies wells as point sources.131
The County’s injection wells collected and channeled the area’s
wastewater, making the wells a “confined, discrete conveyance”
under the CWA’s definition of “point source.”132  When consider-
ing whether a discharge occurred, the court realized ambiguities
exist within the CWA’s text and judicial history.133
B. Coverage of Indirect Discharges
The Ninth Circuit addressed the County’s argument that “the
point source itself must convey the pollutants directly into the navi-
gable water under the CWA.”134  The County relied on Alaska’s lan-
guage requiring pollution to travel “through a confined, discrete
conveyance.”135  Focusing on the word “through,” the County ar-
gued the pollution must be released to navigable waters directly
from a confined point source.136  Pollutants released from a point
128. See 243 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d
at 744 (stating conditions for CWA violation).
129. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 744 (finding discharge definition to be
main issue on appeal).
130. Id. (describing uncontested findings of law).
131. Id. (noting County’s wells fell perfectly within point source definition).
Though wells are listed as an example of CWA point sources, the Ninth Circuit
noted Inland Steel created an exception when pollution is completely contained.
Id. at 750 (holding not all disposals to groundwater are regulated).  The wells in
Inland Steel did not require NPDES permits because they were located beneath
impermeable rock, making pollution of the above groundwater impossible.  Inland
Steel Co. v. EPA, 901 F.2d 1419, 1420, 1422 (7th Cir. 1990) (justifying completely
contained pollutant disposals).
132. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 746 (defining “point source” under
CWA).
133. Id. at 745-46 (citing contradictory interpretations of “discharges” under
CWA).
134. Id. at 745 (recounting County’s arguments to escape liability).
135. Id. at 746 (citing Trs.’ for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir.
1984)) (defining point source).
136. See id. at 745-46 (explaining County argues diffusion through ground-
water is not comparable to direct ocean outfalls).  The Ninth Circuit noted that
even if the court accepted such narrow language, the County would still be liable
because the effluent flows “through” the wells before entering the Pacific Ocean.
Id. (stating plaintiffs still prevail under direct discharge requirements). The
County’s interpretation of Alaska’s language, as limiting the CWA’s scope to direct
hydrological connections, is inaccurate. Id. (explaining Alaska did not encounter
non-point source discharge issue).
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source but entering a navigable water through diffuse or indirect
means, such as through groundwater, would not require NPDES
permits under the CWA.137
The Ninth Circuit rejected the County’s interpretation of
Alaska, relying on Greater Yellowstone to support liability for dis-
charges with indirect hydrological connections to navigable wa-
ters.138  The court found the County’s groundwater conveyance
comparable to Greater Yellowstone’s NPDES permit requirement for
water filtering hundreds of feet underground from a point source
before reentering surface waters.139  Additionally, the court looked
at qualifications of aerial diffusion into nearby waters as a point
source discharge, as discussed in Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk
County.140  Despite ambiguities in the judicial interpretation of
“discharge” under the CWA, the Ninth Circuit found the rationales
in cases such as Greater Yellowstone and Peconic Baykeeper supported
coverage of indirect discharges.141
Justifying this theory, the Ninth Circuit looked to Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos to clarify ambiguities in the direct-ver-
sus-indirect discharge debate.142  Though the Ninth Circuit histori-
cally deferred to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence clarifying wetland
involvement under the CWA, the lack of wetlands at issue led the
court to examine Justice Scalia’s textualist interpretation of the stat-
ute.143  Justice Scalia observed that neither the words “direct” nor
“directly” appear in the CWA.144  The CWA only forbids the “‘addi-
137. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 745-46 (explaining County’s argument
that indirect discharges are not within CWA’s scope).
138. Id. at 746 (citing Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143, 1147,
1153 (9th Cir. 2010)) (explaining drain constituted point source and indirect fil-
tering route toward surface water did not impact classification as discharge under
CWA).
139. See id. (emphasizing extent of indirect hydrological connection in Greater
Yellowstone).
140. See 600 F.3d 180, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886
F.3d at 747-48 (noting hose releasing chemicals constituted point source and re-
lease through air to water constituted discharge).
141. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 748 (noting other courts recognize indi-
rect discharges).
142. Id. (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 743 (2006)) (agreeing
with Justice Scalia to read statue on its face).
143. Id. (explaining Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is irrelevant to issue in
Haw. Wildlife Fund).
144. Id. (explaining Justice Scalia’s assertion that legislative intent is reflected
in CWA’s wording).
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tion of any pollutant directly to navigable waters,’” an encompassing
definition upon which all justices in Rapanos agreed upon.145
Despite an argument for deference to the EPA’s recommenda-
tions to limit the CWA’s coverage to only “direct hydrological con-
nections,” the court denied the EPA’s statutory interpretation.146
The court asserted that the EPA “reads . . . words into the CWA  . . .
that are not there.”147  As researchers and the EPA informed the
County of its polluting actions on multiple occasions, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found the County had fair notice that its actions violated the
CWA.148  The court held when pollutants in navigable waters are
more than “de minimus” and are “fairly traceable” to a point
source, the CWA covers such indirect discharges.149
V. CAUGHT UP IN THE CURRENT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hawaii Wildlife Fund draws a
line in the sand during one of the most controversial times in CWA
history.150  With the judicial and executive branches at odds over
the appropriate scope of the CWA, Hawaii Wildlife Fund pushes the
law toward greater levels of environmental protection.151  Despite
taking a stance on the hydrological connection issue, the court’s
decision leaves many other questions unanswered.152
145. Id. (agreeing with Justice Scalia’s textualist analysis rooted in judicial
history).
146. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 749 (finding indirect discharge is func-
tional equivalent of direct discharge).
147. Id. at 752 n.3 (stating historical deference to EPA does not give EPA
authority to read non-existent words into CWA).
148. Id. at 752 (finding reasonable person would understand CWA prohibited
County’s actions).
149. Id. at 749 (setting standard for liability under CWA).
150. See Gary Steinbauer, The Clean Water Act Goes Underground: An Analysis and
Implications of the Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui,
AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_re
sources/publications/trends/2017-2018/march-april-2018/the-clean-water-act-
goes-underground.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) (discussing controversy and
confusion amongst courts surrounding CWA’s hydrological connection
requirements).
151. See Practitioner Insights: Maui Groundwater Case Shows Government Retreat is
Bad for Everyone, BLOOMBERG ENV’T & ENERGY REPORT (May 16, 2018), https://
www.bna.com/practitioner-insights-maui-n73014476005/ (describing EPA’s reli-
ance on states to implement CWA).
152. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae In Support of Plaintiffs-Ap-
pellees at 24, Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018)
(No. 15-17447), 2016 WL 3098501, at *24 (noting ambiguities left open even if
hydrological connection issue is resolved).
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A. Precedential Consistency
While the court’s judgement does not defer to the EPA, it
aligns with the majority of precedent.153  Second Circuit decisions
in Southview Farm and Peconic Baykeeper find indirect pollutant dis-
charges to be of equal concern and effect as direct discharges.154
The Fourth Circuit concurs with this viewpoint, especially in cases
following Hawaii Wildlife Fund.155  Furthermore, the court follows
previous Ninth Circuit precedent.156  Though rejecting the
County’s narrow interpretation of Alaska and its language requiring
pollutants to flow “through” a point source, the court remarks the
narrow interpretation would still apply here, as water still flowed
through injection wells before entering the Pacific Ocean.157
Despite cases like Ecological Rights where the EPA did not re-
quire NPDES permits for indirect discharges, these situations dealt
with non-point source pollution.158  The Hawaii Wildlife Fund court
only purports to regulate point source pollution in line with the
CWA’s text.159  The Ninth Circuit decision espousing direct hydro-
logical connection requirements thus finds itself in sync with a judi-
153. See Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cty., 600 F.3d 180, 188-89 (2d Cir.
2010); see also Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d
114, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1994); Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 44-45
(5th Cir. 1980); Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 881 (9th
Cir. 2001) (illustrating Ninth Circuit aligns with case law from Second, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits).
154. Accord Peconic Baykeeper, 600 F.3d at 188-89; Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at
118-19 (explaining CWA point source language emphasizes starting point for pol-
lution, not method of conveyance).
155. See generally Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887
F.3d 637, 650 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding CWA only requires discharge comes “from”
point source).  As the CWA’s language emphasizes where pollutants originate and
where they settle in navigable waters, there is no emphasis on the method of con-
veyance. Id. (supporting idea of less emphasis on conveyance methods).  The stat-
ute’s plain meaning does not require that the point source “convey the discharge
directly to navigable waters.” Id. (analyzing CWA through traditional form of judi-
cial interpretation).
156. See Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir.
2001); see also Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143, 1147, 1153 (9th
Cir. 2010); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburgh, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th
Cir. 2007); League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th
Cir. 2002) (illustrating how Haw. Wildlife Fund continues trajectory of Ninth Circuit
precedent).
157. See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 746-47 (9th Cir.
2018) (noting both broad and narrow interpretations of Alaska would still require
County to acquire NPDES permit).
158. See Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 507
(9th Cir. 2013) (addressing non-point source pollution rather than point source
pollution).
159. See Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 749 (emphasizing decision regulates
point source discharges and not all discharges).
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cial history supportive of an inclusive CWA “discharge”
interpretation and more stringent environmental protections.160
B. Ambiguities in Interpretation
While legislators intended the CWA to provide guidelines for
reducing water pollution, the statute lacks hard-line rules according
to practitioners.161  The point source discharge requirement is no
exception, as questions persisted for decades regarding what types
of discharges may be regulated.162  In the circuit court debate over
the substantiality of required hydrological connections for CWA
coverage, the Ninth Circuit responded that direct hydrological con-
nections are not required.163
Despite this seemingly firm stance, the decision opens up con-
cerns that Hawaii Wildlife Fund defined groundwater as a “water of
the United States.”164  Though scholars note this ambiguity, the
court expressly stated that it was not deciding that issue in this
case.165  The Ninth Circuit did not advocate to regulate all ground-
water, leaving the question of whether groundwater should be en-
tirely regulated for another day.166  The holding only addresses if
the method of conveyance to a navigable water affects a pollutant’s
coverage under the CWA.167  In line with decisions such as Inland
Steel, when pollution is deposited into groundwater that never
160. See generally Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cty., 600 F.3d 180 (2d Cir.
2010); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2010); Carson
Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001); Sierra Club v.
Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980) (illustrating Ninth Circuit’s consis-
tency with other courts).
161. See R. Timothy Weston, et al., What’s the Point (Source)? New Developments in
the Ongoing Debate Concerning Clean Water Act Jurisdiction over Indirect Discharges via
Groundwater, K&L GATES (Mar. 4, 2018), http://www.klgates.com/whats-the-point-
source-03-04-2018/ (discussing lack of EPA guidance and effects amongst courts).
162. See Charles Duhigg & Janet Roberts, Rulings Restrict Clean Water Act, Foil-
ing E.P.A., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/us/
01water.html (describing years of CWA litigation where defendants argued ambi-
guity precluded prosecution).
163. See Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 749 (affirming textual interpretation
of CWA is unsupportive of direct discharge requirement).
164. See Patrick Parenteau, The Clean Water Rule: Not Dead Yet, 48 ENVTL. L.
377, 394-95 (2018) (expressing concern that Ninth Circuit’s decision defines
groundwater as “water of United States” under CWA).
165. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at n.2 (stating court’s holding does not uni-
versally categorize groundwater as water of United States under CWA).
166. See id. at 749 (stating issue of when hydrological connection is too tenu-
ous is saved for future proceedings).
167. See id. at 752 (finding method of conveyance irrelevant provided pollu-
tants originate from point source).
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reaches navigable waters, it is not subject to NPDES permits.168  The
Ninth Circuit does not stretch precedent by holding groundwater is
only covered by the Act when it conveys pollutants from a point
source to a navigable water.169
Though the Ninth Circuit properly decided the CWA covers
indirect discharges, its language breeds uncertainty by stating the
CWA provides coverage when pollutants are “fairly traceable” to a
point source.170  “Fairly traceable” is a murky standard, which may
spur future litigation over the traceability of an entity’s pollutant
discharge.171  The decision creates a need for a sliding scale ap-
proach to the CWA’s analysis, one dependent upon facts and cir-
cumstances.172  Just like water, the analysis is difficult to delineate
and takes the shape of whichever mutable limitations contain it.173
Despite these ambiguities, the court’s holding values environmental
protection over administrative convenience.174
Overall, the court’s decision marks a necessary refusal to nar-
row the CWA, rather than an attempt to broaden it.175  Justice
Scalia’s textualist analysis in Rapanos persuasively alleges that the
addition of a direct hydrological connection requirement adds
meaning to the CWA in contravention of Congressional intent.176
168. See id. at 751 (stating categorical protections or exclusions for wells is
inappropriate under CWA).
169. See Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir.
2001); see also Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143, 1147, 1153 (9th
Cir. 2010); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburgh, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th
Cir. 2007); League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th
Cir. 2002) (listing legal background in accordance with Ninth Circuit decision).
170. See Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 749 (listing standards for liability
under CWA).
171. See Practitioner Insights: Maui Groundwater Case Shows Government Retreat is
Bad for Everyone, supra note 151 (noting further definition needed for “fairly tracea-
ble” standard).
172. See Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in
Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-04/documents/rapanosgui-
dance6507.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) (explaining importance of fact-specific
analysis in CWA cases).
173. See Practitioner Insights: Maui Groundwater Case Shows Government Retreat is
Bad for Everyone, supra note 151 (noting difficulties in CWA interpretation).
174. See Lawrence S. Bazel, The Clean Water Act at Thirty: A Failure After All These
Years?, 18 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 46, 46 (2003) (describing challenges implementing
CWA over time).
175. See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 746 (stating
Justice Scalia’s textualist approach highlighted that direct discharge requirement
never appears in CWA).
176. See Practitioner Insights: Maui Groundwater Case Shows Government Retreat is
Bad for Everyone, supra note 151 (illustrating Rapanos’s role in Ninth Circuit
decision).
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Specifically, the legislature’s choice to write the CWA’s text to state
“discharge” rather than “direct discharge” illustrates a congres-
sional intent for the CWA to cover both direct and indirect dis-
charges to navigable waters.177  As a statute designed for
environmental protection, further restrictions on its breadth un-
duly undermine its purpose.178
VI. IMPACT: WHAT HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND WASHES ASHORE
The Ninth Circuit’s decision challenges the sense of “coopera-
tive federalism” on which the EPA depends.179  Throughout its his-
tory, the EPA largely depended on state and local authorities to
implement the CWA.180  Broadening the CWA’s scope, however,
narrows the autonomy of local authorities.181
By allowing state and local entities to determine when an
NPDES permit is required, the amount of environmental protec-
tion afforded will depend on local attitudes toward environmental
regulations and industry.182  As a result, some states will experience
less regulations and more pollution than others, affecting wildlife
and human health.183  As water pollution does not discriminate be-
tween state boundaries, pollution from one state may end up in
another.184  In the past, the EPA’s lax approach to permit enforce-
ment gave states more individualized control over permitting re-
177. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 743 (2006) (discussing propri-
ety of facially reading CWA’s text to encompass indirect discharges).
178. See History of the Clean Water Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/history-clean-water-act (last visited Sept. 23, 2018)
(explaining CWA arose out of public concern toward water pollution).
179. See Cooperative Federalism at EPA, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/home/cooperative-federalism-epa (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) (dis-
cussing EPA’s dependence on states to help implement laws); see also Practitioner
Insights: Maui Groundwater Case Shows Government Retreat is Bad for Everyone, supra
note 151 (describing history of EPA reliance on states).
180. See EPA Advances Cooperative Federalism Through Designation Process for Sul-
fur Dioxide and Ozone Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
newsreleases/epa-advances-cooperative-federalism-through-designation-process-
sulfur-dioxide-and (last visited Dec. 22, 2018) (discussing cooperative federalism’s
role in implementing other initiatives such as ozone standards).
181. See generally Heath, supra note 7 (discussing balance between business
autonomy and government regulation).
182. Id. (analyzing how differences in state grants’ effectiveness correlated
with differences in ability to regulate through permits).
183. See id. (drawing attention to inconsistencies in state CWA application
and effects).
184. See generally Watersheds, Flooding & Pollution, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOS-
PHERIC ADMIN., https://www.noaa.gov/resource-collections/watersheds-flooding-
pollution (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) (discussing how water pollutants travel to
other areas through rivers, lakes, runoff, and flooding).
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quirements, resulting in more variation amongst state permitting
systems.185  The Ninth Circuit’s holding requiring NPDES permits
for all point source discharges, whether direct or indirect, attempts
to remedy this concern and equalizes protections available to the
states.186  While the court’s holding does take away some state au-
tonomy and raises federalism concerns by increasing EPA oversight,
it reflects concerns of pollution’s pervasive effect on all states and
wildlife.187
As the County of Maui petitioned the Supreme Court for certi-
orari on August 27, 2018, Hawaii Wildlife Fund’s broad impacts re-
main hanging in the balance.188 Even if the Supreme Court refuses
to grant certiorari, the Ninth Circuit’s holding still marks a shift in
circuit opinions toward a refusal to narrow the CWA, a trend influ-
ential over CWA implementation.189  Given the many cases follow-
ing Hawaii Wildlife Fund’s lead, a future Supreme Court decision on
the matter remains a clear possibility.190  Should the Supreme
Court decide in favor of the County, the decision would mark an
espousal of textualist CWA interpretations in favor of clearer CWA
185. See Daniel C. Mizell, EPA’s Failure to Administer NPDES Permit System Leads
to a Judicial Mugging. Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Co., Inc., 4 MO.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 101 (1996) (discussing EPA’s shortcomings in NPDES
permit enforcement).
186. See Practitioner Insights: Maui Groundwater Case Shows Government Retreat is
Bad for Everyone, supra note 151 (discussing need for any step toward clarifying
CWA).
187. See id. (noting Hawaii Wildlife Fund’s imperfections and concerns pitted
against environmental needs).
188. See Ria Rana, Splitting from Other Circuits, Sixth Circuit Limits the Scope of the
Clean Water Act, ENVTL. L. MONITOR (Sept. 27, 2018), https://environmental-
lawmonitor.com/2018/09/27/splitting-from-other-circuits-sixth-circuit-limits-the-
scope-of-the-clean-water-act/ (analyzing circuit splits on CWA’s interpretation).
With recent shifts in the Supreme Court’s makeup, it is unclear if the Court will
favor a textualist interpretation or one in favor of clearer implementation. See
Adam Liptak, How Brett Kavanaugh Would Transform the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/02/us/politics/judge-kava
naugh-supreme-court-justices.html (explaining Supreme Court ideological shifts).
As Justice Kennedy, traditionally a “swing vote” justice, played a significant role in
deciding environmental precedent, his retirement and the recent confirmation of
Justice Kavanaugh mark a shift toward a more conservative Court. Id. (illustrating
ideology’s impact on judicial interpretation).  If the Supreme Court takes on the
hydrological connections issue, it is unclear whether Justice Kavanaugh will heavily
weigh EPA recommendations aligning with the Sixth Circuit’s approach to the
CWA or the textualist analysis supported by the Ninth Circuit and made by former
ideologically conservative, Justice Scalia. Id. (explaining Justice Kavanaugh’s pow-
erful impact on Supreme Court decisions).
189. See Rana, supra note 188 (outlining Sixth Circuit opposition to CWA’s
indirect discharge coverage and illustrating industrial concerns over broad statute
implementation).
190. See id. (hypothesizing split between Sixth Circuit and Fourth and Ninth
Circuits will lead to Supreme Court intervention).
22
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol30/iss2/5
2019] BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS? 373
terms and expedient implementation.191  Such an outcome would
leave billions of gallons of pollution unregulated.192  If the Court
follows precedential trends and decides in favor of the Plaintiffs,
however, the decision will institute stronger environmental protec-
tions with a cost of spurring future litigation over unclear terms
such as “fairly traceable.”193  Either way, it is likely that the legisla-
ture will be continuously prompted to clarify the CWA’s terms.194
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit created an opportunity for broad
environmental protections.195  For industry-driven states and com-
panies, however, such precedent will unavoidably raise compliance
costs as these entities adapt to new practices.196  Specifically, the
decision will have the greatest impact on local municipalities and
the agricultural, construction, and mining industries.197  As these
activities have high potential to produce non-point source pollution
from chemical runoff or waste by-product groundwater contamina-
tion, those entities will need to invest in costly storage and filtration
systems to prevent water contamination.198  Notwithstanding this
sizable up-front investment, the Ninth Circuit decided Hawaii Wild-
life Fund with an eye on the long-term impacts of water pollution.199
As it stands, Hawaii Wildlife Fund helped institute one of the most
191. See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 748 (9th Cir.
2018) (describing Justice Scalia’s commentary that word “direct” never appears in
CWA).
192. See What is the Biggest Source of Water Pollution in the Ocean?, supra note 14
(illustrating billions of gallons of water pollution resulting from indirect
discharges).
193. See Carney, supra note 11 (discussing environmental regulations’ effect
on businesses); see also Practitioner Insights: Maui Groundwater Case Shows Government
Retreat is Bad for Everyone, supra note 151 (noting potential for future litigation over
CWA’s unclear terms).
194. See Practitioner Insights: Maui Groundwater Case Shows Government Retreat is
Bad for Everyone, supra note 151 (discussing need for future definition of CWA).
195. See Water Pollution, supra note 2 (discussing need to counteract pollu-
tion’s effects); see also Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143, 1147, 1153
(9th Cir. 2010) (showing Ninth Circuit’s impact); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of
Healdsburgh, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007) (exemplifying Ninth Circuit’s
broad protections); League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181,
1190 (9th Cir. 2002) (demonstrating broad definition of point source); Headwa-
ters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 534 (9th Cir. 2001) (providing
expansive environmental protection).
196. See Carney, supra note 11 (noting high costs of switching toward greener
practices).
197. See id. (discussing industries primarily affected by CWA).
198. See id. (noting compliance costs).
199. See Headwaters, Inc., 243 F.3d at 532 (looking to long-term effects); see also
Greater Yellowstone Coal., 628 F.3d at 1147, 1153 (outlining Ninth Circuit’s prece-
dent); City of Healdsburgh, 496 F.3d at 999-1000 (establishing two-part test); League
of Wilderness Defenders, 309 F.3d at 1190 (discussing EPA’s reasonable interpretation
standard).
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controversial debates in CWA history, diverting the legal current
toward more inclusive regulation and showing that indirect dis-
charge pollution is far from water under the bridge.200
Allison R. White*
200. For a discussion on the political and judicial climate surrounding the
CWA, see supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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